and perhaps a car. At the same time, cheap labour, domestic migration flows, the disestablishment of state owned enterprises and the welfare net that they represented, have thrust millions into uncertainty and the particular poverty of a precarious client relationship with the marketised State.
Although the actual economics of status are not the main focus of this special issue, they are of course crucial to the conditions through which a newly forming idea of class, if not class itself, is managed and performed. In all of these discussions it is important to bear in mind that status does not necessarily translate into fixed class positions, but that class is generally characterised in part by high or low status. We are interested here not just in how an idea of class is made and unmade by wealth and relative poverty, but how it is claimed and reproduced through the actions of the State and of individuals, or indeed bypassed by short term self interest. Arguably, the absence of clearly defined class categories and attendant class interest groups and strategies makes the status seeking behaviour of Chinese elites, middle-income workers and the working poor even more important. One hypothesis for China's idea of class might be that status is the end point of consumer endeavour, and that self-interest has deferred class interest. Further, the rise of nationalism and the central policy of harmonisation allow this deferral to continue, with the social energies of the people being deflected into larger scales of rhetorical belonging. Our question then might be: will the practice of taste differentiation gradually create mutually acknowledged social groups and relations, or is consumption hiding a chaotic and atomistic meltdown of the social and political order?
Using the terminology of class is therefore vexed, and slippages occur easily. Erik Wright Olins has recently acknowledged that class is usefully theorised (in three traditions) vis-a-vis social position and economic opportunity, power and exploitation, materiality access and behaviour (2009: 102) . All are relevant to the Chinese case, although we also suggest that class may be elided by the presumption of the State's interests, even as these processes continue.
A way into this conundrum might be to consider the degree to which class consciousness is at work in socio-political interactions. There are certainly levels of attainment and privilege in China, which are based on birth opportunity more than on inherent merit. Provincial origin and immediate family background still matter in one's life chances. The poor are many and various however; if there is class consciousness among them, it is sporadic and localised. There are also those who are not poor as such; they have average expectations for themselves and their children, and they might in other contexts be defined as working class. Now, they are inevitably caught up in the aspirational culture of a consumer driven urban market-which in turn determines the nature of their struggle and opportunity, and which also dissipates class interests in favour of the immediacy of adaption and survival. There are the well off, the rich, and the super-rich, and their sense of class is stronger insofar as they both understand their exposure to instability both politically and financially, and are able to work politically to protect themselves. Their grouping, the articulate elites in Reform China, is more an act of organisational will by the leadership of the Party than it is an organic achievement of the market, and these upper/middle populations are thus vulnerable to shifts in politics as well as to the vagaries of global finance. 
The new utopia
The Party's vision of a harmonious xiaokang one-class/no-class society responds to the need to consolidate and harness the successes of the economic reform, and addresses the traumatic social differentiations that have been caused in the process. 'Harmonious society' promises redress, over time, for the increasing gap between the rich and poor.
In this sense the Chinese middleclass-to-be is similar to the new middle classes of other areas of recent affluence in Asia, described by Stivens as 'the children of these hypertrophic states ' (1998: 13) . They are both real and important, but not quite what they are made out to be in the political rhetoric of the State. These are not the middle classes in the sense that they are challenging a ruling class; they are rather commanded and compounded as a legitimising product and constituent of the ruling elite's political and economic power. The inclusion of their relative success is crucial to the narrativisation of China's economic miracle.
The rhetorical insistence on harmonising economic disparity and social difference reveals both political anxiety and a new Utopian vision. In some quarters, it reinvokes the spectre of old-style class conflict, which has been the cause and subject of deeply signify 'relative affluence' and 'civilised.' It should be a social stratum that will form the mainstay of the citizens of a future Chinese xiaokang society. As leading members of a 'relatively affluent' future China, he further elaborates, the middle class should be not only economically well off, but also high in spiritual-cultural quality (jingshen wenhua suzhi).
Middle-class-making, as the foundational project for post-reform affluent China, not only depends on State-led economic development, but also involves normative cultural practices which necessitate the active participation of the State and society at large, from the economic sectors to individual aspirants. Taste is thus allied to social value and in turn to the harmonisation of cultural and political behaviours.
Post-Mao
Class conceptualisation in China is not necessarily only tied to social stratification and economic divisions, which of course also exist and have done so in the past. It is also about the harmonious ordering of the social body as a tapestry of correct behaviours and placements. Such social ordering was corrupted in the recent history of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Mao Zedong's class analysis and social categorisation oscillated between self-serving political strategies, and the notion of class struggle became the basis for endless campaigns against enemies of the Party-State (Schram 1984) . Maoist class struggle did not refer to active social divisions but to roughly applied concepts of blood lineage, and expediency. Mao's notion of class is thus inherited but deviates from its classical Chinese precedent. Jieji, the neologism for class in modern standard Chinese is taken from modern Japanese, which in turn was translated from classical Chinese. It denotes distinction and structural classification but in a different sense. While jieji originally connotes 'hierarchical degrees on a continuum' (Kuhn 1984: 17) , it does not classify groups of people but mark their places in a given order. In its early form it points to a fixed order of aristocratic distinction, 'linked to a routinized system of political preferment' (Kuhn 1984: 17) . The important point here is that classically jieji highlights distinction based on political preferment.
But though the image of jieji as fixed degrees in a continuum persisted, its actual reference changes in time. The use of jieji has its own history. For instance, 'by late imperial times, the meaning of ji had shifted entirely away from inherited aristocratic status and was associated with the eighteenth-rank system of bureaucratic distinctions' (Kuhn 1984: 18) . This suggests that since late imperial times (1368-1912) jieji was no longer a fixed system of distinction in China, as advancement in bureaucratic distinction through personal political effort, rather than through birthright, became the determining factor in social classification. It was not a system that relied on inherited social origins; but, while prioritising political preferment, it also presupposed, in fact, relied on, social mobility based on education and practices of personal as well as group cultivation. The economic factor only figured indirectly in this shifting grid of preferment and status, though that also became increasingly important. The jieji system of distinction was generally supplemented by the division of society into occupational status groups, such as the four categories of shi nong gong shang: scholar-gentry, agriculturalists, artisans, and merchants. If this latter socially hierarchical system was economically differentiated, it was so in terms of a universal economic priority determined by the State's fiscal interest rather than by individual or group wealth (Kuhn 1984: 20) . When
Liang Qichao first used the term in 1899 to introduce European thought on social and economic power through Japanese interpretation, he meant it as the gradient that separated society whilst binding it closely together (Liang quoted in Kuhn 1984: 20) .
This first 'modern' use of class is still more akin to a grading system rather than a social grouping based on economic status.
Mao's grasp and articulation of Chinese social relations in the twentieth century centered on class and class struggle. As an absolute principle it steered half a century of Chinese political and social life. This was a combination of the Marxist precept of economically determined class, and the shifting politically volatile grid of jieji, which was both exploitative and socially imagined. Its deployment was thus contingent and fraught with conceptual contradictions and political tension. That tension continues today, but the focus is on consumption of goods and the production of national wealth within a discourse of State legitimation, rather than on the incorporation of political doctrine into the self as an end and means. The self is still a political body, but the performance of class attributes supports the nation-State as an organisation, and not an ideological habitus.
Post-Bourdieu
In debates on class and social stratification outside the Chinese system, there is common reference to Pierre Bourdieu's theorisation of 'the habitus ' (1984: 169) . By situating 
Contributions to the special issue
This special issue seeks to locate and describe how the newly forming class interests of the wealthy and aspirational emerge both as exemplars and as aspirants to the security Luigi Tomba's essay looks directly at the production of a Chinese middle class during the Reform period and the factors that have contributed to it. He highlights the role of a growing group of big spenders and consumers in China's economic growth and political stability. Tomba argues that a dramatic status enhancement for wage-earning Chinese professionals has been among the major determinants of social change in the late 1990s
and that this process happened despite the market more than because of it. Tomba's essay shows that the development of a high-consuming urban society has been as much the outcome of the social engineering project of the contemporary reformist state and its agencies as it has been a consequence of the opening up of the economy and society.
In the section 'New Perspectives Reports,' our two authors engage directly with cultural debates in PRC on class taste, the media and social change. In all these papers, the use of the term middle class is strategic rather than absolute, insofar as the term already refers to an empty categorisation, and a shifting set of practices, habits and aspirations. The use of the term is nonetheless helpful in that, although it does not indicate a class structure or indeed class habits familiar to other societies (or not necessarily), it aptly captures both the deployment and elision of class consciousness in China post-Mao.
